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Philosophers have been fascinated, lately, with reasons, as such.  Though we boast a long history of  
attention to Reason, and even to reasoning, the current interest is in reasons—though not in 
particular reasons, but in reasons as a class, reasons per se.  We would do well to consider how we 
were led to this interest and what we hope to gain from it.  I recommend both questions for 
consideration, but, for better or worse, I will not pursue them here.  My own view is that we were 
led here, in the main, by skeptical concerns, and what we have to gain, in the main, is a better 
understanding of  our agency, together with the avoidance of  important confusions.  Unlike some, I 
doubt that the study of  reasons, as such (or, for that matter, the study of  Reason or of  reasoning), 
will tell us very much about what we ought to do or about what is good or of  value.   
However, rather than defend these positions here, I will instead argue that we should think about 
reasons, as such, differently than many have been thinking of  them.  Many think of  reasons as facts, 
propositions, or considerations that stand in some relation to attitudes, actions, events, states of  
affairs, or perhaps some other fact or consideration.  They think of  the relation as either an 
explanatory one or, as they put it, a “normative” one.  I will suggest, instead, that we should see 
reasons as items in pieces of  reasoning.  Reasons relate, in the first instance, not to psychological 
states, events, or states of  affairs, nor even to other considerations, but rather to questions.  Their 
relation to a question is neither explanatory nor “normative.”  If  we must give it a label, we could 
call it “rational”—but the label will be uninformative: it would mean only that the reason bears or is 
taken to bear on the question. 
After presenting (my understanding of) the current way of  thinking about reasons, I will sketch 
three difficulties that arise when you think of  reasons in this way.  The chief  benefit of  the 
alternative is that, by relating reasons, first, to questions, we bring rational agency into view:  It is the 
thinker, the rational agent, who settles questions and therein forms attitudes or sets themselves to 
act—that is, to bring about events or states of  affairs.  The thinker thus mediates between 
considerations, on the one hand, and attitudes, actions, events, or states of  affairs, on the other.  In 
contrast, the current way of  thinking, which relates reasons directly to attitudes and actions, occludes 
rational agency—it hides the use of  reasons in thought.  By bringing the thinker into view, the 
alternative can avoid the difficulties that arise on the current way of  thinking.  (This paper draws 
heavily on two previous papers, which started life as a single paper arguing for this position—that 
we should think of  reasons as items in pieces of  reasoning.   I here complete the original ambition.)   1
CURRENT THINKING 
To start, consider the current thinking.  It is common for philosophers, when thinking about 
reasons, to begin with the thought that reasons explain.  The fallen tree explains the power outage, 
and it is the reason for the outage.  The fact it is an El Niño year explains the heavy rainfall and is 
the reason for the rainfall.  Thought of  in this way, it is easy to conflate reasons and causes—though 
we would do well to remember that causal relations and explanatory relations differ.  As P. F. 
Strawson puts the point: 
if  causality is a relation which holds in the natural world, explanation is a different matter.  
People explain things to themselves or others and their doing so is something that happens 
in nature.  But we also speak of  one thing explaining, or being the explanation of, another 
thing, as if  the explaining was a relation between the things.  And so it is.   But it is not a 
natural relation in the sense in which perhaps we think of  causation as a natural relation.  It 
does not hold between things in the natural world, things to which we can assign places or 
times in nature. It holds between facts or truths.  2
In addition to explaining, reasons can play very different roles: they can justify, or count in favor, 
or show correct, or be grounds for.  The fact that it is nearly dinnertime counts in favor of  leaving 
the office and is a reason for leaving.  The fact that she was innocently unaware of  the problem is 
the reason for her silence and justifies her silence.  Justifying, counting in favor, and showing correct 
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have been lumped together, recently, under the label “normative.”  One now-standard approach 
analyzes these so-called “normative” relations as multi-place relations.  For example, Scanlon claims 
that a reason in what he calls “the standard normative sense” is a four-place relation, holding 
between a fact, a person, a circumstance, and an action or attitude of  that person.    Referring to the 3
same class, John Skorupski adds further variables and complexity.     4
There seems to be broad agreement on the basic divide into explanatory and “normative.”   5
Once we move beyond it, matters become more controversial, and some of  the underlying 
difficulties start to appear.  I will consider three. 
THE FIRST DIFFICULTY 
The first such difficulty is that the counting-in-favor-of, or “normative,” relation can seem more 
mysterious than the explanatory relation; in fact, it can seem, itself, to require explanation.  Thus, 
philosophers sometimes take the explanatory relation as primitive and claim that the “normative” 
relation holds when a consideration explains something—often something about value (broadly 
speaking).  For example, John Broome identifies ‘normative’ reasons (specifically, ‘perfect’ reasons) 
as facts that explain ‘ought’ claims.   For Jonathan Dancy, reasons are grounded in values.   Daniel 6 7
Fogal argues that reasons are considerations that explain what there is reason to do—where “what 
there is reason to do” is not understood in terms of  reasons, but rather in terms of  “normative 
support.”   8
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Other philosophers, still taking the explanatory relation as primitive, characterize “normative” 
reasons as those that explain something “non-normative.”  For example, in his early book, Mark 
Schroeder claimed that a consideration is a “normative reason” for action if  (roughly) it is part of  an 
explanation of  why a given action would satisfy some desire.    Stephen Finlay understands 9
“normative” reasons, generally, as explanations of  why something is good, and then he gives 
reductive, “end-relative” account of  good.  10
By explaining reasons for action in terms of  something else, these philosophers risk an 
additional sort of  worry.  The worry is brought out clearly by Schroeder, who notes that his own 
view—according to which what explains your reason for action is, in every case, the possible 
satisfaction of  some desire of  yours—may make acting for reasons seem “objectionably self-
regarding.”  By explaining the reason by appeal to desire-satisfaction, it seems that Schroeder has 
turned us all into a certain kind of  hedonist or egoist.      
Schroeder points out, though, that the objectionably self-regarding objection depends on what 
he calls the “no background conditions” view, which holds that any consideration that explains why 
some other consideration is a reason for action itself  becomes part of  the reason for acting.  
Schroeder denies this.  He believes the facts that explain why a consideration is a reason for action 
stay in the background.  Because facts about your desires do not become part of  your reason for 
acting, your action does not become objectionably self-regarding. 
However, Schroeder points out, with puzzlement, that most philosophers assume the no-
background-conditions view.  He thinks this strange, noting that the facts that explain a thing do not 
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typically become part of  that thing: the fact that someone is elected and inaugurated explains why 
that person is president, but those facts do not become part of  the president.    11
I side with the majority, here, thinking that considerations which explain why a fact is a reason 
for action typically become “part” of  the reason to act.  For support, I would first point to the 
intuitiveness of  a collection of  problems that would not otherwise arise.  These include not only the 
self-regarding objection Schroeder hopes to avoid, but also the rule-worship objection to rule 
utilitarianism and a handful of  concerns that moral theory provides the “wrong” or “ulterior” 
motives for moral action.  Pritchard famously thought that moral philosophy rests on a mistake 
because, in trying to explain why you must do your duty, it provides an ulterior motive.  Kant, before 
him, accused all previous moral theories of  making the same error.  Williams worried that, by 
justifying saving your spouse, moral theory would (peeve your spouse and) attack your integrity, 
alienating you from your own motives.   Along the same lines, one might worry that reflective and 12
thoughtful divine command theorists can only practice piety while Kantians can be only 
conscientious (or concerned with coherence)—one can worry that explanations spoil virtue.  I refer 
to this collection of  concerns as the problem of  “bleed through”—and it depends on the no-
background-conditions view: it depends on the thought that the explanation of  why a reason for 
action is a reason for action will, if  believed, become part of  one’s reason for acting, and so color 
one’s motivations.  While Schroeder would point to this collection of  problems to support his claim 
that philosophers are widely committed to the no-background-conditions view (and he seems to 
think we can avoid these problems by denying it), I would instead point to the intuitive appeal of  
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these problems as support for no-background-conditions view.  They seem genuine problems, 
problems that do not simply disappear with the assertion that explanations stay in the background.  I 
will later be in a position to say a tiny something about why.   
For now, we are cataloging difficulties.  The first difficulty is the apparent mystery of  the 
counting-in-favor-of  relation.  Some explain it terms of  ought facts or value, others would reduce it 
to some “non-normative” relation, and at least one person, T. M. Scanlon, simply takes it as 
primitive.   
THE SECOND DIFFICULTY 
A second difficulty appears when we consider, not the explanation of  the counting-in-favor-of  
relation, but rather the explanation of  actions done for reasons.  It is sometimes thought that 
reasons for action explain action by providing motivation to act.  The fact that I am hungry not only 
explains my eating, but it also motivates me to eat, and, one might think, it is my reason for eating.  
Likewise, the fact that she betrayed me motivates me to avoid her, and it is my reason for avoiding 
her.  
Once we note that we can explain actions that are themselves done for reasons, we may want to 
ask the question with which Donald Davidson opened “Actions, Reasons, and Causes:”  “What is 
the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s 
reason for doing what he did?”   That is, we may hope to understand the role of  the reason for 13
which the person acted—the agent’s reason, as Davidson calls it—in the explanation of  the action.  14
The most simple of  views would explain the action simply by appeal to the agent’s reason: If  Jae 
left the store because it was closing, then the store’s closing—Jae’s reason for leaving—explains Jae’s 
departure.   
 Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford University Press, 13
1980).
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Difficulties for the simple view appear when we remember that people are fallible: Perhaps Jae 
was mistaken; she thought the store was closing, but it was not.  Fallibility generates two types of  
difficulty.  15
First, if  the store was not closing, then there was no reason to leave.  Yet Jae’s action was 
undertaken for a reason—she did not act on a whim, for no reason.  It seems we must say that she 
acted for a reason that was no reason.   To make sense of  this, we need a way to talk about the 16
considerations that someone took to count in favor of  an action, on the basis of  which they acted, 
whether or not the considerations actually counted in favor of  acting.  Scanlon calls these 
“operative” reasons; many others call them “motivating” reasons.   Davidson has something like 17
this in mind when referring to “the agent’s reason for doing what he did.”  So, it seems, this worry 
might be met by making a distinction and introducing new terms. 
But, once make that distinction and introduce those labels, we encounter a second, more serious 
worry for the simple view:  Operative reasons cannot themselves explain the action, at least in cases of  
error.  We cannot explain Jae’s departure by appeal to the fact that the store was closing—because 
there is no such fact.  Something that is not the case cannot explain something that is.   We need a 18
fact, to explain Jae’s departure. 
The fact that seems obvious to employ, for this purpose, is the (psychological) fact that Jae 
thought the store was closing.  We might, then, abandon the simple view and instead appeal to 
 Jonathan Dancy forcefully draws attention to these problems.  See Dancy.  I here focus on mistakes of  fact. One 15
might instead mistake what the facts count in favor of  doing.  Such cases generate further complication, but, I believe, 
can be handled in the same way I will propose handling mistakes of  fact.
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psychological facts to explain action.  In fact, we might appeal to mental states that contain, as their 
content, the agent’s reason for acting.   This was Davidson’s strategy. 19
Notice, though, how sharply we thereby separate the reasons that explain Jae’s action and Jae’s 
own reasons for acting.  The reasons that explain her action are facts about her psychology, while 
her own reason for acting had nothing to do with her psychology.  She did not take facts about her 
thoughts to count in favor of  leaving (as she might if, say, all who did not share the beliefs of  the 
congregation were asked to leave).  Rather, she took the imminent closure to count in favor of  
leaving.  And, even though she was mistaken about the closing, she was right to take the closing, 
rather than her thoughts about it, to be what counted in favor of  leaving.  Only so can we say that, 
since the store was not closing, nothing that counted in favor of  leaving.  And only so can we say 
that, if  the store was closing, there was reason to leave, even if  Jae was did not know it.  If  we 
insisted that our beliefs, themselves, are what count in favor of  acting, we would have to say that we 
do not, by making our beliefs more accurate, improve our information about what we have reason to 
do.  This is unacceptable.    20
Reasons that count in favor of  acting are typically facts about the world at large, rather than facts 
about the actor’s own psychology.  And yet, in light of  our fallibility, it seems that the psychology 
explains the action.  Jae’s departure is explained by facts about her psychology, even when she is 
correct.  The imminent closure seems dispensable.  And thus it seems, not only that the reasons that 
 Michael Smith calls these “motivating reasons.”  Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).  What 19
Parfit, Dancy, and Schroeder call “motivating reasons,” Smith often calls “my normative reason.”  (Operative reasons 
face the further requirement that they play a role in explaining action.)  I much prefer Smith’s use of  “motivating.”  
 Even Bernard Williams does not insist that your beliefs are themselves either what counts in favor of  action or what 20
you take to count in favor of  acting.  You have a reason not to drink the petrol, and no reason to do so, even when you 
believe that it is gin and desire to drink a gin and tonic. (Williams insists you have a reason only if  it possible, given certain 
idealizations, for you to believe that you have that reason. See Williams, "Internal and External Reasons.")  Thinking that 
beliefs themselves are what counts in favor of  acting is extreme.  
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explain an action and the agent’s reasons for acting are different kinds of  things, but also that the 
second, the agent’s reasons, are somehow inert, in the explanation.  Call this “Dancy’s Objection.”  21
Davidson himself  eventually raised a second kind of  objection for his own view: psychological 
states that contain considerations that count in favor of  acting can explain a person’s action, even in 
cases in which the agent did not act for those reasons.  Davidson’s example involves a climber who 
desires to be safe and believes that dropping the rope that is holding his partner would make him 
safe, and these together so unnerve him that he inadvertently drops the rope.  The possibility of  
such “deviant causal chains” shows that Davidson has not yet answered his question: he has not yet 
identified the relation between the reason and the action when the reason explains by action by 
being the agent’s reason.  The considerations are the agent’s reason only if  they explain the action 
“in the right way,” as Davidson put it, “through a course of  practical reasoning, as we might try 
saying.”  He therefore despaired of  providing a causal account.  22
And so our second, Davidsonian strategy has not succeeded: we have yet to understand the role 
of  the agent’s own reason, in the explanation of  action.  Moreover, as noted by Thomas Nagel, that 
role must, in some way, relate the reasons that explain the action to those (if  any) that (in fact) count 
in favor of  acting—lest it turn out that “we don’t really act for reasons at all… we are caused to act 
by desires and beliefs, and the terminology of  reason can be used only in a diminished sense to 
express this kind of  explanation.”  23
A third strategy (one which, I believe, was the target of  Davidson’s article) would deny that 
actions are explained in anything like the way we explain other (mere) happenings.  According to this 
 See Dancy.  I hope the parallel to certain forms of  skepticism is clear: if  we explain the non-veridical case by appeal to 21
appearances, it seems we no longer have need of  reality.  Dancy makes the connection in "Arguments from Illusion," The 
Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 181 (1995): 246–8.  Although I see Dancy’s worry, I am not, myself, gripped by it.  Below I 
will explain why. 
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third account, the question “Why did Jae leave?” and the question “Why did the computer crash?” 
bear only surface similarity.  If  you ask “Why did the computer crash?” you are pursuing an ordinary 
explanation, asking, in a quasi-scientific way, “How did it come about that the computer crashed?”  
But, one might think, we explain—when we make intelligible—a human action, we are engaged in a 
different sort of  project, answering a very different sort of  question.  We are not asking, “How did it 
come about that Jae left?,” in a quasi-scientific spirit.  We are instead seeking to make her action 
intelligible by asking, “From Jae’s point of  view, why leave?”  That is, to explain action, qua action, is 
not to say how an ordinary event came about, but rather to say what, from the agent’s point of  view, 
counted in favor of  so acting.  Thus the reasons we appeal to, in explaining the action, are the 
reasons the agent might use, in deciding whether to act.  It will, of  course, be entirely unremarkable 
that such “explanations,” framed as they are from another’s point of  view, sometimes refer to 
falsehoods.  When they do, then, to avoid confusion, we will mark that fact by saying, e.g., “Jae left 
because she thought the store was closing.”  But, in this context, appealing to falsehoods is not a 
problem—we are not explaining how something came about, but rather how things appear from a 
certain vantage.  And so the addition of  “she thought” does not contribute to the explanation—it is 
not an appeal to a piece of  psychology.  It simply makes explicit what is true in any such 
explanation: it is given from the agent’s point of  view.   24
While I have great deal of  sympathy for this kind of  view, it was a position of  this sort that 
Davidson’s article displaced.   Davidson, in effect, pointed out that there may be a great many 25
 Dancy seems to adopt this kind of  view: “We explain the action by showing that the answer to the . . . question [Had 24
things been the way he supposed them to be, would his action have been the one there was most reason to do?] is 
yes. . . . to explain an action is to justify it only in a certain sense” Dancy, Practical Reality, 9. Later he says, “The 
explanation of  an action succeeds to the extent that it enables us to see how the agent might have taken certain features 
of  the action as good reasons to do it” Ibid., 95.  (Note the “might have.”  That is the hook for Davidson’s objection.)  
It is worth noting that this view can allow other ways of  explaining the event—neural explanations, for example. See 
Ibid., 176-77.  See also "Two Ways of  Explanining Action," Royal Institute of  Philosophy Supplements 55 (2004). 
 Davidson’s explicit target was A. I. Melden, Free Action (Routledge, 1961).  Another was G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention 25
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Co., 1957).  For contemporary versions, in addition to Dancy, see Frederick Stoutland, 
"The Real Reasons," in Human Action, Deliberation, and Causation, ed. Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (Dordrecht: 
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possible answers to the question, “From her point of  view, why leave?” which, as things in fact 
happened, played no role in her leaving—because, e.g., she did not notice them.  In answering the 
question, “From her point of  view, why do thus-and-such?”, we will make intelligible why someone 
could or would or might so act.  We reveal relations of  justification that hold between features of  the 
situation.  But we have not, thereby, yet done anything to explain what in fact happened.  Davidson, 
in effect, simply reasserted the demand for a more ordinary explanation.  The demand seems to me 
appropriate—and our questions remain outstanding:  How do we relate the agent’s own reasons for 
acting to either the reasons which explain her action or the reasons (if  any) that in fact count in 
favor of  acting?  This is the second difficulty in our catalog: the explanation of  action done for 
reasons. 
THE THIRD DIFFICULTY 
Moving to a third: the standard accounts of  what it is to be a reason leave open a problem that is 
called, by some of  us, “the wrong kind of  reason problem.”   Recall that the standard accounts 26
understand “normative” reasons as considerations that count in favor of  (or justify, show valuable or 
correct, or stand in a “normative” relation to) actions or attitudes.  But certain considerations seem 
to count in favor of believing or admiring or intending (that is, they bear the same relation, whatever it 
is, to believing or admiring or intending that reasons for action bear to acting), and yet they seem to 
be the wrong kind of  reasons for the attitude.  For example, the fact that it would let you sleep is a 
reason for believing everything will work out.  It surely counts in favor of  believing, in just the same 
way it counts in favor of  wearing earplugs or counting sheep.  It bears the same relation to believing 
 I am understanding the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem in the way I have elsewhere understood it, and I will use 26
“wrong kind” accordingly.  For a short summary, see Pamela Hieronymi, "The Use of  Reasons in Thought (and the Use 
of  Earmarks in Arguments)," Ethics 124, no. 1 (2013).
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that it bears to those other activities.  But it is the wrong kind of  reason for believing.  We seem to 
encounter the same problem for a host of  attitudes.   27
Some attempt to address this problem by identifying, as the right kind of  reason, the reasons 
that would show the attitude as good, or correct, or fitting, as an attitude of  that sort.  Thus the 
right kind of  reason for a belief  are those that show it good as a belief, the right kind of  reason for 
admiration are those that show admiration fitting, the right kind of  reason for intending to be those 
that show intending correct, etc.  Such an account must, of  course, specify what it is to be “good as” 
or “fitting” or “correct,” if  it is to identify the right kind of  reason.  But there are two further, less 
obvious, challenges such an account must face.   
First, such accounts will identify reasons of  the right kind with good reasons, but the distinction 
between reasons of  the right and wrong kind seems orthogonal to the distinction between good and 
bad.  While the fact that it would help me sleep is the wrong kind of  reason for believing everything 
will work out, the fact that I am a Capricorn and my stars are aligned is just a bad reason—it is not a 
reason of  the wrong kind.  We need a way to understand bad reasons of  the right kind. 
One might respond by claiming that reasons of  the right kind are those the person took to show 
the attitude as good of  its kind.  Thus, the fact that the stars have aligned is a reason of  the right 
kind so long as the thinker takes it to show that the belief  is good of  its kind, but it is a bad reason 
of  the right kind of  the thinker is mistaken.   
 The problem seems to be that the relation in which a reason stands when it counts in favor of  an action (showing the 27
action good or worth doing) is not the relation in which a reason stands when it counts in favor of  an attitude (showing 
something about the target or content of  the attitude). In the former case, “counts in favor of ” means something like 
“shows something good about bringing about,” but in the latter “counts in favor of ” just means “is a reason for.”
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This response addresses the challenge by attributing to the thinker thoughts about what makes 
beliefs good, qua beliefs.   We would be unable to draw the distinction for any thinker who lacks the 28
concept of  belief.    
Even if  we accepted this cost, we face another difficulty:  While it is criticizable, and sometimes 
even irrational, to believe for bad reasons, it seems (at least to many of  us) impossible to believe for 
reasons of  the wrong kind.  That is, it seems, at least to many people, that you cannot believe at 
will.   It similarly seems impossible to admire or resent for reasons of  the wrong kind.  An account 29
that identifies reasons of  the wrong kind as reasons that fail to show something good of  its kind will 
leave this unexplained, because failing to show a thing good of  its kind is not generally a bar to 
employing a reason.  To illustrate: I can make a move in our chess game, not because it would be 
good qua chess move, but because it will end the game so we can all finally leave.  Even though I do 
not think this reason shows the move good qua chess move, I have no difficulty acting on it.  In 
contrast, even if  I think the importance of  sleep, on this occasion, massively outweighs the good of  
maintaining a proper epistemic state, I cannot believe in order to get a good night’s sleep.  And, just 
as importantly, even if  I mistakenly think that the fact that it would help me sleep shows the belief  
 Alternatively, one could posit a mechanism that does this work.  See Nishi Shah and J. David Velleman, "Doxastic 28
Deliberation," Philosophical Review 114, no. 4 (2005).  I reply at Pamela Hieronymi, "Controlling Attitudes," Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (2006): footnote 4. by essentially making the point in the next paragraph in the main text. 
Another strategy, pursued by Kurt Sylvan, would identify the right kind of  reason as those competently treated as reasons, 
where competence is understood dispositionally.  This successfully avoids the over-intellectualization problem and would 
allow for some fallibility and occasional performance failures.  However, because Sylvan understands “reasons” as good 
reasons (what he calls “objective reasons”), the view will rule out cases in which a person reasons reliably badly:  If  I am 
reliably disposed to treat the fact that I am a Capricorn as a reason to draw conclusions about my fate, I will not be 
manifesting a competence.  Perhaps this strategy could be modified, to claim that the right kind of  reasons are those that 
are treated in the way that they would correctly be treated if  they did show the attitude fitting or correct.  This would 
avoid the over-intellectualization problem and allow bad reasons (though it would run into trouble with the next point in 
the main text).  The difficulty will be in identify “the way they would correctly be treated, if  they did show the attitude 
fitting.”  I suspect that “way” is “as bearing on the relevant question.”  See Kurt Sylvan, "What Apparent Reasons 
Appear to Be," Philosophical Studies  (2014).
 For an argument that it is impossible, see Hieronymi, "Controlling Attitudes."; "Believing at Will," Canadian Journal of  29
Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (2009). 
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good qua belief  (because, perhaps, a good night’s sleep will help with tomorrow’s scientific 
investigations), I still will not be able to believe for this reason.   
ALTERNATIVE 
With these three difficulties in mind (the mystery of  the “normative” relation, the difficulty of  
identifying the role of  the agent’s reason in the explanation of  actions done for reasons, and 
accounting for the difference between the right and wrong kind of  reason for certain attitudes), I 
would like to suggest an alternative account of  reasons, one which re-arranges the pieces and 
thereby rearranges the philosophical tasks.   When trying to understand reasons, we should not start 
with the fact that reasons explain, or justify, or count in favor of, or motivate events, states of  affairs, 
attitudes, or actions.  They do all of  these in virtue of  a further, more fundamental fact about them.  
I suggest we begin instead with this thought:  Reasons are items in pieces of  actual or possible 
reasoning.  Reasoning is thought organized in a certain way: directed at a question or conclusion.  
Thus, I would suggest, reasons are considerations that either bear or are taken to bear on a question.   
An important thing to note:  Reasoning can be wrong, mistaken, off, and still be reasoning.  
Thus, on this way of  understanding reasons, bad reasons are still reasons—they are just bad reasons.  
Good reasons are considerations that actually bear, or that are correctly taken to bear, on a question.  
Bad reasons are considerations that are taken to bear on a question but are not good reasons.   30
Another important thing to note: taking is not believing.  This alternative account does not claim 
that reasons are considerations believed to bear on a question.  To take a consideration to bear on a 
question is not to form a belief  about the consideration, the question, and the “bearing on” relation.  
Rather, to take a consideration to bear on a question is to employ that consideration in addressing 
the question.  Again, reasons are items in pieces of  reasoning.  
 So, Jae had a reason to leave, but it was not a good reason, because the store was not, in fact, closing.  The distinction 30
between good and bad admits all the different layers that the distinction between justified and unjustified admits: 
correctly taken to bear, given omniscience and omnibenevolence, or given goodwill and what the thinker believes at the 
time, or given what the thinker ought to have known, had they exercised due care, or… etc.
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Finally, reasoning is organized thought, not explicit deliberation.  Explicit deliberation is a 
conscious activity that unfolds across time.  Organized thought need not be.  I can take reasons to 
bear on, or to settle, a question without explicitly deliberating about that question.  
The most important change, in moving to this proposed alternative, is this:  Considerations no 
longer become reasons in virtue of  some relation in which they stand to an event, a state of  affairs, 
an action, or an attitude—whether explanatory or “normative.”  Instead, considerations become 
reasons in virtue of  their relation to a question.  With this alternative in view, I hope the idea of  
relating considerations directly to events or states of  affairs—even psychological states and events that are 
actions—will seem odd, a kind of  unholy juxtaposition of  the rational and the empirical.   But, 31
more to the point, by relating reasons first to questions, we thereby require questions to mediate 
between considerations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the actions or attitudes they might 
explain, justify, count in favor of, show correct, or ground.  This mediation by questions is the most 
important change, because it allows us—in fact, it requires us—to bring rational agency into view: it 
is the rational agent who, by settling questions, by concluding or deciding, forms attitudes and sets 
themselves to act—sets themselves to bring about events or states of  affairs.  It is thus the agent, the 
thinker, who mediates between considerations, on the one hand, and states of  affairs or events, on 
the other.  Views that relate considerations directly to attitudes or actions, even by appeal to multi-
place relations that include the agent, thereby obscure the agent’s role—they obscure the activity of  
the thinker, in concluding or deciding or committing.  The most important contribution of  this 
alternative account is that it brings rational agency (reasoning, concluding, deciding) into view.  I 
hope now to show how doing so helps to address the difficulties we have considered.   
IDENTIFYING THE WRONG KIND OF REASONS AND THE “VOLUNTARY” 
Let us start with the wrong kind of  reasons problem.  Notice, first, that certain states of  mind (e.g., 
belief, intention, admiration, resentment) can relate to questions in two distinct ways.  A state of  
 One might recall the quote from Strawson, about the difference between explanatory and causal relations.31
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mind sometimes appears in the content of  a question, as part of  what the question is about.  We can 
ask why she believes her country is less safe, or when he became so angry, or why they admire him 
so much.  But certain states of  mind relate to questions in a different, more direct—or, perhaps, 
more indirect—way.  Consider the relation between the question of  whether the butler did it and the 
belief  that the butler did it.  By settling the question, you form the belief.  But the question is not 
about your belief.  It is about things at some distance from you: the butler and his crime.  Still, by 
settling it positively, you make something true of  yourself—right here at home, so to speak.   You 
make it the case that you believe the butler did it.  The relation between the question and the state 
of  mind seems indirect if  you consider the question’s content: the question is not about the state of  
mind.  But it seems direct if  you consider agency: by settling the question positively, one therein 
believes.   
I would suggest that we understand certain states of  mind—most centrally, belief  and intention
—as themselves forms of  question-settling.  It is this form, I think, that gives applicability to the 
request for one’s reasons.   But in saying this, in saying that to believe P, for example, is to settle the 32
question of  whether P, or that to intend to x is to settle the question of  whether to x, I do not mean 
to posit a new, independent psychological event or activity, the settling of  a question, that somehow 
accompanies believing or intending.  Rather, I mean to claim that belief, intention, and the rest, are, 
themselves, helpfully thought of  as question-settlings; question-settling is something like a genus 
into which these attitudes fall as species.   
If  we see these attitudes as forms of  question-settlings, then we can both distinguish the right 
from the wrong kind of  reasons for them and say why they are not voluntary—in fact, we uncover a 
useful characterization of  what “voluntary” means, in this context.   
 This claim will be more fully defended in a manuscript currently in progress.  See also "Two Kinds of  Agency," in 32
Mental Actions, ed. Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Sorteriou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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To start, we can distinguish the right from the wrong kind of  reason.  The right kind of  reasons 
for an attitude that is a question-settling are considerations that bear or are taken to bear on the 
relevant questions.  Reasons of  the wrong kind manage to count in favor of  the attitude in some 
other way—typically by showing the attitude in some other way good or useful or worth having.  33
 We can also give a useful characterization of  what we might mean by “voluntary,” and we can 
see why believing is not voluntary in this sense.   An activity is voluntary, in the relevant sense, if  it 34
can be done for any reason that you take to show it worth doing.  You can raise your right hand, run 
for office, or plant azaleas for any reason that you think shows it worth doing—to win a bet, or 
make a joke, or make a point.  In contrast, you cannot believe something, e.g., that the butler did it, 
in order to win a bet, make a joke, or make a point—even if  you think it would be worth doing.  You 
can only believe what you take to be true.  We can thereby specify the sense in which ordinary 
actions are voluntary, while believing is not.   
Finally, we can say why believing is not voluntary, in this sense:  You might find yourself  with 
reasons that show believing P good to do that you do not take to bear on whether P.  You could get 
a good night’s sleep if  you could believe everything will work out, but you do not take the possibility 
of  a good night’s sleep to show that everything will work out—you take it to show, instead, that it 
would be good to believe that.  But the question of  whether everything will work out and the 
question of  whether it would be good to believe everything will work out are different questions, 
and you cannot settle a question for reasons you do not take to bear on it.  35
Why can you not settle a question for reasons you do not take to bear on it?  Because, if  you 
settle a question for a reason, you have therein taken the reason to bear on the question.  And so, as a 
conceptual matter, you cannot settle a question for a reason that you do not take to bear on it.  Thus, 
 See "The Wrong Kind of  Reason."33
 This section, about this specific sense of  “voluntary,” repeats, with minor modification, some material found in "I'll 34
Bet You Think This Blame Is About You,"  (forthcoming).
 This argument is made, at length, in "Controlling Attitudes."; "Believing at Will."35
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if  you find yourself  with reasons that you take to show believing P worth doing (or, a belief  that P 
worth having) that you do not take to bear on whether P, you will find yourself  with reasons that 
you take to show believing worth doing, but you will not be able to believe for those reasons.  And 
so it is that belief  is non-voluntary: you cannot believe for any reason you take to show believing 
worth doing. 
Perhaps surprisingly, just the same is true of  intention.  You might have reason that you take to 
be sufficient reason to intend to 𝜑—reason enough to house the intention—but that you do not take 
to be reason enough to 𝜑—not reason enough to act.  Perhaps you have no intention of  marrying 
your partner, and they are unhappy about this fact.  Because you like to please your partner, you 
would be happy to house the intention—so long as you do not need to go through with the 
marriage.  You are out of  luck.  In order to intend to marry, you have to decide to marry—to intend, 
you must settle the question of  whether to act, not just the question of  whether to intend.  And so, 
even though you take yourself  to have reason enough to intend, you will not be able to intend.  
Somewhat surprisingly, then, although you can act at will—though you can act for any reason you 
take to show the action sufficiently worth doing—you can no more intend at will than you can 
believe at will.    While actions are voluntary, intentions are not. 36
 It is difficult to generate the problem for intention, because there are very few constraints on the reasons for which 36
one can act (most any consideration could, in principle, bear on the question of  whether to x) and it is possible to act as 
a way of  making yourself  intend.  (So, if  you are unhappy that I have no intention to attend your party, I can decide to 
attend your party in order to keep you happy—even if  what you really care about is my intention, not my attendance.) In 
fact, the case of  pleasing your partner is not the exactly a case of  the wrong kind of  reason for intending, because, if  
you thought that housing the intention were reason enough to marry, you could decide to marry in order to have the 
intention.  The reason bears on the question, but you do not take it to be sufficient reason to settle the question.  In 
contrast, the Toxin Puzzle case (Gregory Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43 (1983).) and the original case of  Mutual 
Assured Destruction are ones in which the reason to intend does not bear on the question of  whether to act, because 
the reason to intend disappears before the time of  action, and this is known in advance.  These cases present reasons 
that are genuinely of  the “wrong kind”.   
The full argument that you cannot intend at will appears in Hieronymi, "Controlling Attitudes."  The marriage example 
appears in "Responsibility for Believing," Synthese 161, no. 3 (2008); "Reflection and Responsibility," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 42, no. 1 (2014); "Forgiveness, Blame, Reasons..." in 3am: magazine, ed. Richard Marshall (2013).
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The same is also true of  a wide range of  attitudes—of  any attitude that manifests our take on 
the world, on what is true, important, worthwhile, insulting, wonderful, horrifying, trustworthy, or 
impressive, for which we can be asked our reasons.  This range of  attitudes must be non-voluntary, 
in the sense just explained, in order to play the roles they play and bear the significance they bear in 
our lives.  If  a state of  mind is voluntary, one can do it any reason one takes to show it worth doing
—you can, for example, imagine a red circle for any reason you take to show it worth doing.  But if  
a state of  mind is voluntary in this way, it will not reveal your take on what is true, or important, 
worthwhile, insulting, etc.  Instead, like an ordinary action, it reveals your take on what is worth 
doing—in particular, it reveals your take on whether imagining a red circle, e.g., is worth doing.  
We have just connected questions of  voluntariness with the wrong-kind-of-reason problem: 
Attitudes that are non-voluntary, in sense in which believing is non-voluntary, are also, and therefore, 
subject to a wrong-kind-of-reason problem: you might find yourself  with reasons that you take to 
show them worth having that you do not take to bear on the relevant questions.   
EXPLAINING ACTIONS DONE FOR REASONS 
In addition to clarity about the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, about volunatariness, and about our 
agency with respect to our attitudes, we also gain some degree of  clarity about the role of  the agent’s 
reason in the explanation of  actions done for reasons.  We can adopt an extremely simple, formal 
account that will explain an action by appeal to what are, from the explainer’s point of  view, facts, 
while also both preserving the proper role of  the agent’s own reasons for acting (if  the agent had 
reasons ) and relating the agent’s reasons to the reasons (if  any) that in fact count in favor of  acting.   37
The account is embarrassingly simple:  We explain events that are actions done for reasons by 
appeal to the following complex fact: the agent took certain considerations to settle the question of  
whether to act, therein intended so to act, and successfully executed that intention in action.   
 The account accommodates action for no (particular) reason (by allowing that we can settle a question for no reason).37
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Using this form, we answer the ordinary explanatory question, “How did it come about that Jae 
left the store?,” by appealing, in part, to the fact that Jae settled a different question—the question of  
whether to leave.  To answer our explanatory question, we appeal to the fact that Jae settled her 
practical question for her (operative) reason. Her operative reason thus appears in our explanation; 
but it appears as her operative reason, bearing, for her, on her question.  Following Davidson’s 
intuitions, we have explained the action by providing ourselves with something like “a course of  
practical reasoning” (albeit a very short one).   
We have also avoided Davidson’s criticisms:  We have done more than make the action 
intelligible from Jae’s point of  view.  We have claimed that certain considerations were those for 
which the Jae, in fact, formed an intention, which intention she executed in the event that was the 
action.  We have, I think, satisfied the demand for a more ordinary form of  explanation.    
Relatedly, the account avoids the possibility of  deviant causal chains: the agent, for certain 
reasons, settles the question of  whether to act, therein intends to act, and executes that intention in 
the event that is the action.  The connections are too tight for deviance.  38
Moreover, the account also provides a fairly clear view of  the relation between the reasons (if  
any) that in fact counted in favor of  leaving and the reason that explains the action: the complicated 
fact that explains the action includes within it the fact that the agent treated certain considerations as 
reasons “in the standard normative sense.”  It thereby addresses Nagel’s concern. 
One might still harbor Dancy’s worry: the agent’s own reason—the imminent closure—seems 
dispensable.  But once we have shown the role it plays, I think we need not be troubled.  It seems 
appropriate that the agent, or the agent’s activities, should, so to speak, “stand in” for those 
 One might object:  That fact that it does not allow for deviance shows that the account is not explanatory.  It merely 38
provides an analysis of  action done for reasons.  No explanation will be given until the pieces of  this analysis are filled in.  
This is an interesting objection.  For now, I will simply note that I have provided, for action done for reasons, something 
like the following explanation of  how it came about that the Sox won: by the end of  the game, they had scored more 
runs than their opponent.  I agree this is an uninformative explanation, perhaps no explanation at all.  But, if  we hope to 
explain the win (rather than, say, movements of  humans on a field), any (further) explanation must fill out this form.  
Likewise, I will be satisfied if  it is agreed that, if  we are to explain action in a way that preserves the role of  the agent’s 
reason for acting, the explanation should fit into the form or analysis here proposed. 
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(purported) facts that the agent takes to be reason-giving.  It is the agent, not the facts that call for 
action, that brings the action to be.   39
We should notice, though, that not all of  the reasons that might explain an action fit into this form.  
In fact, not all the reasons that both explain and justify actions will fit.  This is as it should be. The 
question of  whether to act and the question of  why someone acted as they did or whether they 
acted well or as they ought are different questions, and we should expect that we can sometimes 
answer the latter without answering the former.  For example, the fact that he was deceived, or the 
fact that she was innocently unaware, might both explain and justify an action done for reasons, but, 
of  course, neither of  these were the agent’s reason for acting.  And, we sometimes explain an action 
(even our own, current action) by setting it in a context that makes it intelligible, without providing 
the agent’s reasons.  If  asked why I am breaking eggs, I might explain that I am in the middle of  
making an omelette.  I have made myself  intelligible to you.  But I doubt I have provided you with 
my reason for breaking the eggs: my own reason for acting cannot, I think, be the fact that I am 
already in the process of  so acting.  (We might also wonder whether explanations such as “she was 
hungry” or “I just felt like it” are functioning to give the agent’s own reason, or are rather simply 
placing in context.  It may be an open question, or perhaps even indeterminate in certain cases.)  
By more clearly separating the practical question of  whether to act from the justificatory 
question of  whether someone acted as they ought or had reason to, we easily allow for the many 
different layers of  which justification admits:  We can ask, did the person do as they ought or had 
reason to, given what they knew at the time? Or, given the facts they did not know but ought to have known?  
Or, given things as they in fact were?  Each can receive a different answer.  In fact, we leave open the 
possibility of  justifying or showing correct (or beautiful) things other than actions and attitudes done 
for reasons: as, it seems, we should.   
 Much of  the sub-section above again repeats, with minor modification, material found in "Reasons for Action."39
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THE MYSTERIOUS “NORMATIVE” RELATION 
Finally, let us turn to the category of  the so-called “normative.”  The word came into prominent use 
in the philosophical literature, I believe, after the publication of  Christine Korsgaard’s Sources of  
Normativity.   In that work, Korsgaard invites her reader to choose for themselves “the normative 40
word”—the word that indicates, to the reader, that it would be incoherent to continue practical 
deliberation, incoherent to keep asking whether you really must, e.g., tell the truth (that is, whether 
you really should, or ought to, or have most reason to, tell the truth, or whether telling the truth 
would be the best thing, etc.).  For Korsgaard’s argumentative purposes, she explicitly wants the 
word to slip between these different ideas.  But slipperiness now seems its legacy, as a piece of  
philosophical jargon.  Depending on the writer, “normative” may now mean “having something to 
do with reasons,” or with values, or with standards, or with questions of  appropriateness, or, even 
with blame or the “reactive attitudes.”  Worse, one can now find the word qualifying any of  these—
so that, in addition to reading about “normative reasons,” one can now read about “normative 
standards,” or even “normative criticism.”  I have heard the phrase “non-normative good.”  In fact, 
given that the distinction between explanatory and “normative” reasons need not track the 
distinction between good and bad reasons, someone might like to refer to the “normative normative 
reasons.”  The situation has become absurd.   
My own preference is to simply avoid the word, when speaking in my own voice, and to insist on 
more precision.  In doing so, we may lose touch with what some people think of  as a pressing 
philosophical project—an outcome I would welcome.  To explain: 
As noted at the start, those considering reasons as such tend to see them as considerations 
standing in some relation (perhaps a multi-place relation), and tend to divide them, broadly, between 
explanatory  and “normative.”  Many then seem content to treat the relation in which explanatory 
reasons stand to that which they explain (the “explanatory relation”) as primitive, but find 
 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of  Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).40
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“normative” relations somewhat mysterious, themselves in need of  an explanation.  That is to say, it 
seems we need to explain why or how certain things make other things good or bad, correct or 
incorrect, important or unimportant, apt or inapt, obligatory or permissible.   
Or, better, we need to explain what it is for certain things to make other things good or bad, 
correct or incorrect, important or unimportant, required or permissible, etc.  A satisfying 
explanation of  “normativity” must do more than restate the case for specific answers to specific 
questions—do more than say why, for example, it is important to brush your teeth or why you are 
obliged to keep your promises or why it is inapt to end the song on that chord.  To answer specific 
questions is, after all, simply to give further considerations that count in favor of  brushing your teeth 
or keeping your promises or resolving the chord, not to illuminate the “normativity” of  those 
considerations or of  their special relation to the activity.  Nor, it might seem, will it do simply to 
class some of  these answers into domains and notice their structure or similarity—to say that moral 
obligations arise in this way, while prudential requirements arise in that—because, again, such a 
grouping will do nothing to explain the “normativity” of  the domain identified.   And so it might 41
seem that we must answer a higher-order question about “normative” relations, in general—what 
they are, how they hold, and why we are entitled to reason with them.  Such an explanation is very 
difficult to give.  However, absent one, it can seem we are forced to choose between either simply 
granting a strange new primitive or else either discrediting or reinterpreting the thoughts that traffic 
in these terms.  
If  we instead adopt the view here suggested, the philosophical tasks rearrange themselves.  We 
will no longer think that reasons stand in either “explanatory” or “normative” relations to events or 
states of  affairs.  They stand, rather, in relation to questions.  The relation in which a reasons stands 
to a question is neither explanatory (and so, somehow, unproblematic) nor “normative” (and so, 
somehow, problematic).   It is, rather, the question that is explanatory or otherwise.         
 Scanlon appeals to domains in just this way, and he accepts a primitive.  See Scanlon.41
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In fact, it is now difficult to see how to draw the distinction between “explanatory” and 
“normative.”  The question “Why did the engine fail?” seems explanatory, and the reasons that bear 
on it might be called explanatory reasons.   But is the question of  whether the butler did it an 42
explanatory or a normative question?  Reasons for or against believing the butler did it—what some 
would call “normative reasons” for or against this belief—bear on the question, “Did the butler do 
it?,” but their relation to that question seems no more (nor less) “normative” than that which holds 
between the question “Why did the engine fail?” and the considerations that bear on it.  If  the 
considerations that bear on whether to take an aspirin or resolve the chord are “normative” in some 
further sense, that might be in virtue of  the fact that, in asking those questions, I am asking what to 
bring about, rather than what is the case.  But now we have drawn a distinction between (what is 
sometimes called) the “practical” and the “theoretical” or “epistemic”—while, on many uses, 
epistemic reasons are normative. 
We might, of  course, stipulate some class of  questions as the “normative” ones, but I do not see 
which are the obvious candidates—nor, more importantly, do I see why we would want to do so.     
To be sure, we will not avoid the philosophical task of  understanding what it is for something to 
be good or bad, correct or incorrect, justified or unjustified, obligatory or permissible.  But once we 
give up the idea that the “explanatory” relation is unproblematic but “normative” relations require 
explanation, we may not feel the same need to give an entirely general account.  The appeal to 
domain-specific answers—to different answers for music, politics, medicine, epistemology, and 
 There is complication here.  The extreme heat explains the failure, but it seems to be the answer to the question, rather 42
than a consideration that bears on it.  So perhaps the reasons that bear on explanatory questions are not explanatory 
reasons—distancing us even further from the standard account.  Thanks to FIND for raising this issue.
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metaphysics—may no longer seem so dissatisfying (even if  we will want, reasonably, to consider 
their interaction).       43
Returning now, briefly, to the no-background-conditions view: Once we appeal to questions, the 
view seems natural, because, typically, by showing that or how some other consideration bears on a 
question, a consideration will itself, thereby, bear on that question.  Suppose you are wondering why 
the fact that she is exhausted is a reason to help her, and you are told that it is because you would 
want help, if  you were exhausted.  You accept this explanation.  Now, it seems, you will think the 
fact that you would want help, if  you were exhausted, bears on the question of  whether to help her, 
given that she is exhausted.  If  you think of  reasons as considerations that bear on questions, it will 
seem that, typically, a reason that explains why another consideration is a reason to act will, itself, 
become part of  the reasons for action—because it thereby bears on the question of  whether so to 
act.  (There are, however, interesting exceptions, such as in games or institutional roles or reductio 
arguments.) 
CONCLUSION 
The case for starting with the use of  reasons in thought—for thinking of  reasons as items in pieces 
of  actual or possible reasoning—is large but cumulative.  By doing so, we can avoid the wrong-kind-
of-reason problem, understand why beliefs and other attitudes are not voluntary, and recast certain 
metaethical worries.  Elsewhere I have suggested that we also provide ourselves a with way to 
understand our answerability for our actions and attitudes and a way to model of  a central form of  
weakness of  will.   However, the greatest benefit lies in avoiding the difficulty that underlies the 44
 One might look for an explanation or elaboration of  the “bearing on” relation.  Again, I doubt we will find more than 43
domain-specific answers.  The fact that the butler had ready access to the home bears on the question of  his guilt.  If  we 
want to explain why that fact bears on that question, we will point to facts about the crime and what was required to 
commit it.  In giving that explanation, we will have taken for granted other “bearing on” relations, which may, in turn, be 
explained.  I do not see a problem here, nor a general (rather than domain-specific) question that remains mysterious.  (I 
am thus sympathetic to the views found in Ibid. and Sarah Buss, "Against the Quest for the Source of  Normativity,"  (in 
progress).)
 See Pamela Hieronymi, "The Will as Reason," Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009); "Reflection and Responsibility."44
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rest:  By modeling reasons as considerations standing in relation to events or states of  affairs, the 
more standard accounts obscure the role and activity of  the thinker.  It remains mysterious what we 
do with reasons, how anyone acts on a reason, or how anything is anyone’s reason for believing, 
resenting, trusting, or acting.  Yet rational agency, the activity of  settling a question, is, itself, 
something we would like to understand, explain, and evaluate.  We help ourselves by exposing it.   
What we will not do, I think, by thinking about reasons as such, is to discover which are the good 
reasons.  If  we think about reasoning, we might learn something general about reasons and agency.  
But even if  we were to understand what makes for good reasoning, I am doubtful that 
understanding good reasoning, as such, will help us understand very much about how to live or how 
to treat other people or which actions are good—any more than it will help us to understand very 
much about how to bake a cake or which things are beautiful.  But, at this point, that is mere 
conjecture.  45
 As noted, this paper draws heavily on earlier work, and gratitude shown there should be repeated here.  In addition, 45
thanks are due to John F. Horty, audiences at Rice University, the University of  Maryland, College Park; the Ethics of  
Belief conference at Harvard University; and members of  the Ethics Workshop at UCLA.  Finally, Kurt Sylvan provided 
extremely helpful comments in his role as editor.
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